AhnLab Cyber Threat Intelligence Report

TLP : CLEAR


Analysis Report

ARTEX Cyber Threat In-Depth Analysis

Tracking ARTEX and the Black October Threat Landscape

AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC)

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AhnLab

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Overview

1. About This Report

ARTEX is an autonomous penetration testing framework that combines large language models with security tools, connecting asset discovery, vulnerability verification, tool execution, and results consolidation. As a public tool, it can be used for both security assessments and attack activities. This report presents a chronological account of the tracking of ARTEX-related infrastructure, from its identification to the emergence of derivative distributions. It then examines the tool's architecture and its behavior in two penetration tests, followed by incidents in South Korea and abroad and approaches to detection and response.

* Note: This report presents ARTEX tracking and analysis conducted from October and was written to reflect information available at the time.

2. Summary

Infrastructure tracking identified approximately 600 additional IP addresses hosting ARTEX instances. Other security tools, including CyberStrikeAI, were also operating on some of these IP addresses. However, ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI are public tools, and the identification of instances or their operation on the same IP address alone is insufficient to determine maliciousness, the operator, or a connection to a specific attack.

Operational directories exposed to the internet contained material related to web shell control, internal network reconnaissance, pivoting, credential use, and implants. Although the material is consistent with attack activity, no evidence was found that ARTEX generated all of the artifacts or that the two cases were conducted by the same operator. After the original repository disappeared, derivative ARTEX distributions with modified names, interfaces, and agent settings were also identified.

In two penetration tests using ARTEX, the tool planned subsequent tasks and executed tools based on its investigation of the target. On a web server with a file upload vulnerability, it uploaded a web shell and executed a program. In an Apache ActiveMQ environment, it gained

initial access and then executed remote commands on four internal hosts.

Incidents disclosed in South Korea and abroad in October 2026 involved externally exposed entry points, including web services, backend APIs, and outsourced services. Some cases also showed indications of AI agent use, including ARTEX. Externally exposed assets and access paths need to be reviewed, and web, network, and authentication logs should be correlated with endpoint detection results to analyze signs of initial intrusion, command execution, and lateral movement.

Part 1. Tracking ARTEX Infrastructure

1. Initial Infrastructure Identification

*Reference date: 2026-09-30

A. What Is ARTEX?



Figure 1. ARTEX Dashboard

ARTEX is an open-source, LLM-based autonomous penetration testing framework released by GitHub user Autumn-27. It is designed so that multiple AI agents share roles to plan and execute penetration testing processes—such as asset discovery, vulnerability identification, and validation—while allowing users to intervene in the execution process when necessary. The backend is developed in Go, and the web interface is built on Next.Js.

It is believed that ARTEX is likely a project developed within the cybersecurity community in China. Most of the project documentation and user interface are written in Chinese, and the SecSentry community is operated through China's WeChat platform. Additionally, the project documentation explicitly references cybersecurity and data protection laws in mainland China. The developer describes ARTEX as the winning project of Baidu's "agent+" workshop competition.
GitHub: https://github[.]Com/Autumn-27/ARTEX

B. ARTEX Infrastructure

Through infrastructure pivoting, we identified approximately 600 additional IP addresses hosting ARTEX instances.

However, since ARTEX is an open-source tool publicly available on GitHub that anyone can download and deploy, it is difficult to conclude that the approximately 600 identified IP addresses constitute a single infrastructure operated by the same organization or a specific threat actor. It is highly likely that this infrastructure includes numerous operators with no connection to one another, and may also include cases where ARTEX is used for legitimate purposes—such as by red teams, penetration testers, and security researchers—in addition to actual threat actors.

Consequently, the mere fact that an ARTEX instance has been identified is not sufficient to determine whether the IP address is malicious or to link it to a specific threat actor or campaign. Additional context and evidence are required to determine the malicious nature of individual infrastructures and their association with attacks.

C. CyberStrikeAI Overlap

During the analysis of ARTEX hosting infrastructure, numerous instances were identified where CyberStrikeAI was operating concurrently on the same IP addresses. (Https://github[.]Com/aipentest/cyberstrikeai)

CyberStrikeAI is an open-source, AI-based attack security platform that provides multi-agent orchestration, various security tools, workflow automation, attack chain analysis, and WebShell and C2 management capabilities. With over 7,000 stars on GitHub, it is relatively more widely used than ARTEX.

Furthermore, CyberStrikeAI is believed to be a project likely developed by the Chinese security community. Links to the Chinese security community have been identified through the project's developers and related activities, and its public infrastructure has also been observed in large numbers in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

CyberStrikeAI has drawn attention because instances where the tool was identified on infrastructure linked to actual attack activities have already been disclosed. Team Cymru reported that on March 21, 2026, the CyberStrikeAI Service was exposed at 212.11.64[.]250, And NetFlow communication was observed between that system and a Fortinet FortiGate device that was an Attack Target. Additionally, a total of 21 CyberStrikeAI servers were identified between January 20 and February 26, 2026, and a significant number of these were confirmed to be located in China, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

However, both ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI are public tools available to anyone. Therefore, the fact that both tools were detected from the same IP address merely indicates infrastructure overlap; it is not sufficient evidence to conclude that they are operated by the same threat actor or to directly link them to a specific attack campaign.

2. Additional Infrastructure and ARTEX v2

*Reference date: 2026-10-05

A. Additional ARTEX Infrastructure

Further analysis of the web services exposed on the ARTEX-related infrastructure revealed that, alongside ARTEX, various AI API gateways, attack surface management (ASM) platforms, penetration testing frameworks, and security management tools were in operation. Among these, Sub2API—an AI API gateway—was identified on 252 systems (29.72%), Accounting for the highest proportion, while Scope Sentry was found on 22 systems (2.59%) And CyberStrikeAI on 15 systems (1.77%). In addition, other security and attack-related tools, such as ARL-Next, LunaFox, Acunetix, MultiC2, and Mythic, were identified on a small number of systems.

The table below summarizes the web service titles identified in the ARTEX-related infrastructure; it includes not only security-related services but also general-purpose web applications for which no direct connection to ARTEX was confirmed. Simple HTTP errors and status pages were excluded.

Analysis revealed that some infrastructure is not used exclusively for ARTEX but is configured to run security, penetration testing, AI, infrastructure management, and general web services concurrently. However, the mere fact that such services coexist on the same system does not necessarily indicate a common operator, nor does it prove that all identified systems are being used for malicious purposes.

Web Service / Page Title	Korean Meaning	Number of Instances Identified	Percentage	Classification
ARTEX — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console	ARTEX — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console	394	46.46%	AI Penetration Testing
Sub2API - AI API Gateway	AI API Gateway	252	29.72%	AI / API
Scope Sentry	—	22	2.59%	Attack Surface Management

Web Service / Page Title	Korean Meaning	Number of Instances Identified	Percentage	Classification
CyberStrikeAI	—	15	1.77%	AI Penetration Testing
Welcome to nginx!	—	12	1.42%	Web server
Directory listing for /	Directory Listing	7	0.83%	File / Web Server
Loading...	Loading...	6	0.71%	General
Asset Lighthouse System	Asset Identification and Monitoring System	6	0.71%	Asset Management
NoVNC	—	5	0.59%	Remote Management
ARL-Next	—	4	0.47%	Asset Discovery / ASM
Xingrin - Attack Surface Management Platform | ASM	Xingrin - Attack Surface Management Platform	3	0.35%	Attack Surface Management
Log In · AtlasX	Log In · AtlasX	3	0.35%	Security / Management
Grok2API	—	2	0.24%	AI / API
Java Chains	—	2	0.24%	Security Tools
New API	New API	2	0.24%	API
AIClient2API - Management Console	AIClient2API - Management Console	1	0.12%	AI / API
ARTEX v2 · Agent Security Workbench	ARTEX v2 · Agent Security Workbench	1	0.12%	AI Penetration Testing
Acunetix	—	1	0.12%	Vulnerability Scanner
AnyLink	—	1	0.12%	Network / Remote Access
Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works	Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page	1	0.12%	Web server
Cairn	—	1	0.12%	Others
ChatGPT Top-Up_ChatGPT Plus/Pro Top-Up Service_WeChat Pay Activation - AI Membership	ChatGPT Plus/Pro Top-Up and WeChat Pay Service	1	0.12%	AI / Commercial Service

Web Service / Page Title	Korean Meaning	Number of Instances Identified	Percentage	Classification
Top-Up Service				
CloudPanel | Log In	CloudPanel Login	1	0.12%	Server Management
Cpolar	—	1	0.12%	Tunneling / Network
Default Site	Default Site	1	0.12%	Web server
DesRedTeam	—	1	0.12%	Red Team
HTTP Server Test Page	HTTP Server Test Page	1	0.12%	Web server
KSpeeder | Docker Image Acceleration Expert	KSpeeder | Docker Image Acceleration Tool	1	0.12%	Infrastructure
KSubdomain	—	1	0.12%	Subdomain Exploration
LunaFox - Attack Surface Management Platform | ASM	LunaFox - Attack Surface Management Platform	1	0.12%	Attack Surface Management
MinIO Console	—	1	0.12%	Storage Management
MultiC2 Console	—	1	0.12%	C2
Mythic	—	1	0.12%	C2 / Red Team
Nginx Proxy Manager	—	1	0.12%	Infrastructure Management
OpenClaw Control	—	1	0.12%	Management Console
RustFS	—	1	0.12%	Storage
SafeSkill Demo · Mock Receiver	SafeSkill Demo · Mock Receiver	1	0.12%	Development / Testing
SecureFlow - Secure Information Flow	SecureFlow - Secure Information Stream	1	0.12%	Security
TCNet · Linux Agent	—	1	0.12%	Agent / Management
TSCI PRESENTS Cooper Park TEACHING NET	—	1	0.12%	General
Uptime Kuma	—	1	0.12%	Monitoring
WeChat Download API	WeChat Download API	1	0.12%	API

Web Service / Page Title	Korean Meaning	Number of Instances Identified	Percentage	Classification
WorkBuddy Manager	—	1	0.12%	Management
YUTUCMS Data is being updated	YUTUCMS data is being updated	1	0.12%	General Web Service
Food Delivery Platform	Food Delivery Platform	1	0.12%	General Service
Learning Never Ends	Learning Never Ends	1	0.12%	General
Safety Knowledge Challenge: Answer Questions and Enter the Raffle!	Security Knowledge Quiz and Prize Giveaway	1	0.12%	Security / General
Congratulations! Your site has been successfully created!	Congratulations. Your site has been successfully created.	1	0.12%	Default Web Page
Authorization Management System	Authorization Management System	1	0.12%	Management
Xinghe Information Technology Co., Ltd.	Xinghe Information Technology Co., Ltd.	1	0.12%	Company Website
Temporarily Unavailable	Temporarily Unavailable	1	0.12%	General
Overview · grokcli-2api	Overview · grokcli-2api	1	0.12%	AI / API
View Count	View Count	1	0.12%	General
Blasting Expert · Closed-Loop Process Integration Prototype v0.2 (Modular)	Brute Force Expert · Workflow Integration Prototype v0.2 (Modular)	1	0.12%	Attack Tools
Xuandun · Security Situation Awareness Platform	Xuandun · Security Situation Awareness Platform	1	0.12%	Security Platform
Login - Security Analytics Platform	Login - Security Analytics Platform	1	0.12%	Security Analytics
Login · DeepQuant Agent	Login · DeepQuant Agent	1	0.12%	AI / Agent
Log In · Waterdrop Asset Monitoring Platform	Log In · Waterdrop Asset Monitoring Platform	1	0.12%	Asset Monitoring

Web Service / Page Title	Korean Meaning	Number of Instances Identified	Percentage	Classification
Fujian Business College Extracurricular Activities Automatic Management System	Fujian Business College Extracurricular Activities Automated Management System	1	0.12%	Education / General
Premium Online Videos	High-Quality Online Videos	1	0.12%	General
Minjiang University ' s Extracurricular Activities Automatic Management System	Minjiang University Extracurricular Activities Automated Management System	1	0.12%	Education / General
Mofang Resume - AI-Powered Resume Editor	Mofang Resume - AI-Based Resume Editor	1	0.12%	AI / General
Analytics | Global Market Board	—	1	0.12%	General
Analytics: Today's Lucky Winner | ANALYTICS	—	1	0.12%	General

Table 1. Web Services Identified on ARTEX-Related Infrastructure

C. ARTEX v2

During the analysis, we also identified an ARTEX v2 instance exposed to the internet. ARTEX v2 provides a more structured multi-agent execution environment than the existing console, and the interface introduces ARTEX as the "Agent Security Workbench."

In the identified instance, the Planner was coordinating multiple Worker Agents, and we were able to view detailed information such as the execution status and runtime for each Agent. Additionally, various features—such as exploration paths, asset identification, evidence and traffic collection, tool execution, shared workspace data, reports, MCP integration, reusable skills, and agent settings—were provided as separate components.

In the completed test tasks observed within this system, it was confirmed that the central Planner managed multiple Worker Agents simultaneously. Through this, it is concluded that ARTEX v2 is evolving beyond a simple tool for executing autonomous penetration tests into a

platform designed to comprehensively coordinate, log, and manage the autonomous security testing process.




Figure 2. ARTEX v2

3. Evidence of Attack Activity in Exposed Operational Directories

*Reference date: 2026-10-09

We analyzed two operational directories exposed on the Internet. In both cases, we identified evidence consistent with attack activities targeting systems configured to resemble actual systems or real-world environments. Case Study #1 involved an ARTEX working directory, which contained web shell controls, reverse RDP tunneling, pass-the-hash commands, PowerShell-based C2 communications, and reconnaissance data targeting specific internal systems. In Case Study #2, an internal network scan revealed scripts for SSH access to root accounts and extraction of secrets from JVM heap dumps, as well as a Java downloader, a reverse SOCKS worker, and numerous Linux and Windows implants.

According to the intelligence gathered for this analysis, both open directories were identified on internet-accessible hosts where ARTEX was deployed or where ARTEX-related content was exposed. However, such simultaneous exposure is limited to correlations from a detection and infrastructure perspective. This cannot be taken as evidence that ARTEX generated all the artifacts, that the two directories were managed by the same operator, or that the activity is directly linked to ARTEX developers.

The common operational patterns as follows were identified in both cases:

- Utilizing externally exposed controller infrastructure for staging and C2 purposes
- Using compromised or accessible systems as pivot points within the internal network
- Using scripts to automate access, internal navigation, payload delivery, and follow-up behaviors
- Combining multiple protocols and remote access techniques rather than relying on a single communication channel
- Operational files, credentials, and internal infrastructure information were left exposed on systems accessible from the Internet

In Case Study #1, the likelihood that a reverse RDP relay was actually executed was assessed with medium to high confidence, and RDP connection attempts using “pass-the-hash” were confirmed with high confidence. However, there is limited evidence to determine whether the

PowerShell command agent used subsequently established a legitimate callback channel. In Case Study #2, it was confirmed with a high degree of confidence that the operator explored an internal network separate from the Kubernetes Pod network and identified exposed data services and Spring Heap Dump endpoints. Additionally, the automation scripts contained SSH credentials presumed to be for a root account, and evidence was found that the operator had prepared multiple implants and reverse proxy tools to maintain persistent access. However, based solely on the currently available data, it is difficult to determine whether all scripts and binaries included in Case Study #2 were actually executed.

No evidence was found to attribute these activities to Chinese state actors, specific hacking groups, or the ARTEX developers. ARTEX is a publicly available tool, and it is difficult to determine the operator's nationality or location based solely on the project's Chinese-language source, localized metadata, or the use of development infrastructure located in China. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the currently available evidence, both cases are believed to be associated with security activities conducted for offensive purposes. However, no evidence has been found to attribute these activities to a specific region, organization, or the ARTEX developer.

A. Case Study #1

Case Study #1 consists of 37 files identified in the ARTEX working directory. The data includes an ASPX web shell presumed to have operated on CS1-WEB, a reverse TCP relay connecting to an internal RDP server, a "pass-the-hash" command using Administrator account credentials, GUI automation for deploying a PowerShell agent, and evidence of internal reconnaissance targeting three private IP systems.

The most definitive source identification is the ARTEX task path /root/ARTEX/data/tasks/6/i3539, found in the files driver.Sh and run_agent.Sh.

A.1 Reconstructing the Attack Flow

CS1-C2
↓ PowerShell relay staging and exposure of an operator-side listener
CS1-WEB: suspected ASPX command execution path
↓ Reverse TCP relay: external 4443 → internal RDP 3389
Operator local loopback RDP listener
↓ xfreerdp Pass-the-Hash attempt using the Administrator account
CS1-RDP
| Attempted download of C:\Windows\Temp\a.ps1
↓ Raw TCP callback attempt using TCP 4470 or 4471
Unauthenticated relay → local command client

A.2 Suspected Web Shell Command Channel

Ws.Sh identifies itself as a web shell command execution script and sends Base64-encoded commands to a fixed ASPX Path on CS1-WEB. Commands are embedded in form parameters of a specific format, and the request includes a fixed cookie. `Psrun.Sh` encodes PowerShell commands in UTF-16LE and then further wraps them in the `-EncodedCommand` format.

This strongly supports the existence of a pre-configured command execution path. However, the ASPX source code, response body, target IIS logs, and target filesystem data were not obtained. The parent domain, which appears to be a legitimate service, should be treated as a potentially compromised asset rather than malicious infrastructure.

On October 6, 2026, accessing the Path via a standard browser request returned an HTTP 404. This merely confirms that the resource could not be retrieved via a standard GET request at that time. Previously, the client used POST requests containing cookies and form parameters with embedded commands. These requests were not reproduced due to the potential for code execution or evidence tampering. Therefore, the possibility of resource deletion, completion of mitigation measures, conditional routing, or behavior differences based on HTTP methods cannot be ruled out.

A.3 Reverse RDP Pivot

Pivot_relay.Ps1 continuously attempts to establish an external connection to CS1-C2 through TCP port 4443, and internally, it connects to CS1-RDP on TCP port 3389 and relays bidirectional traffic. Decoding `enc.Txt` revealed the same script. The `relay.Log` also contains records

showing that the operator mapped the pivot connection to a local port.

Based on an analysis of the earliest HTTP logs, evidence indicates that CS1-PIVOT sequentially downloaded the Reverse Relay, launcher, and shutdown scripts within approximately 9 minutes. Listener.Log also records connections originating from the same Source identifier. Based on this evidence, we assessed with medium to high confidence that the script was either executed directly on CS1-PIVOT or on a system located behind CS1-PIVOT in a NAT environment. However, this does not prove that CS1-PIVOT and CS1-WEB are the same system.

A.4 Pass-the-Hash-Based RDP Connection Attempts

Driver.Sh and run_agent.Sh execute xfreerdp on a local forwarding port using the Administrator account and the /pth:<NTLM hash> option. The modified Impacket-based inspection script is also configured to use an NTLM hash and a local RDP forwarding port as input.

The execution traces are somewhat conflicting. While driver.Log confirms the execution of the RDP process and identifies the FreeRDP window, rdp_gui.Log contains a record of the connection being terminated via RPC. Subsequently, the driver logs that the process terminated before receiving a callback and that the retry also failed. Therefore, while the current data proves that preparations for a Pass-the-Hash-based RDP connection were made and an actual attempt was made, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that a stable authentication session was maintained.

NTLM-related values have been intentionally omitted from this report. These credentials are considered compromised and require further investigation to determine whether they have been reused.

A.5 PowerShell Command Agent

Agent.Ps1 is a PowerShell-based command agent designed to reconnect in the event of a connection failure. Its main operations are as follows.

1. Transmits a boot marker to CS1-C2 through TCP port 8088
2. Establishes a raw TCP session using TCP port 4471
3. Receives PowerShell commands containing length information
4. Executes command execution by applying an Execution Policy bypass option
5. Returns execution results containing length information

6. Reconnect after a connection failure or termination

Variants that decode `agent_b64.Txt` use TCP port 4470. Such a difference in port numbers serves as an identifying factor that can be leveraged during further hunting. Relay.Py opens a pivot and a local listener accessible without authentication on all interfaces, while c2.Py implements the corresponding operator-side command client.

Driver.Sh directly enters download commands through RDP GUI automation and attempts to save the agent to the Path C:\Windows\Temp\a.Ps1. While the HTTP logs show traces of test downloads in a local loopback environment, no evidence was found that clearly distinguishes agent downloads or callbacks originating from the actual target system.

A.6 Internal Network Reconnaissance

Recon1.Ps1 collects information on local IPv4 interfaces and then scans CS1-RDP and two additional internal systems for key ports related to web, SMB, RPC, SQL Server, RDP, WinRM, and applications.

The data obtained contains only pre-configured target information; no actual scan response results were identified. Therefore, it cannot be proven that the relevant ports or Services were actually open.

B. Case Study #2

In Case Study #2, 14 files were identified. They consist of 4 native executables, 1 Java class, 2 Python-based reverse proxy workers, 2 scan result files, 2 cached Python programs, and 3 cached metadata files. Among these, one metadata entry references an additional cached data object; however, that file is not included in the current dataset.

The entire dataset forms a single, coherent operational flow. The scan results revealed internal network exploration of a Kubernetes Pod network and a separate private network. One of the cached scripts attempts to connect via SSH to CS2-K8S-MASTER as the root user and is written to re-execute a binary that is disguised as a Docker component. Another script extracts application credentials and cryptographic information from JVM heap dumps. The Java class downloads a Linux implant from CS2-C2, and function names and protocol strings compatible with the same C2 are also identified in both Linux and Windows binaries.

B.1 Network and Service Discovery

The scan results for CS2-POD-NET are recorded in `result.Txt`, and a total of 85 systems were identified as active. The identified services include SSH, HTTP, MySQL, Redis, kubelet, MongoDB, Memcached, ActiveMQ, QuestDB, go-mysql-transfer, and numerous Java/Spring application ports. The automated detection results identified the following:

- MongoDB instances accessible without authentication
- Memcached instances accessible without authentication
- ActiveMQ management console accessible with default credentials
- Multiple Spring Actuator Heap Dump endpoints exposed to the outside

The `r1esult.Txt` file lists eight active systems identified in CS2-SECONDARY-NET. SSH was detected across all identified systems, and kubelet was exposed on some nodes. In CS2-K8S-MASTER, etcd and go-mysql-transfer were also detected.

However, these two files are scan output results and do not constitute data that separately verifies the actual accessibility of individual Services. Nevertheless, considering the scope of the scan and the consistency of the results, it is judged that intentional exploration of the internal network was conducted, focusing on the potential exposure of credentials in the Kubernetes environment and the application layer.

B.2 Root SSH Access and Maintenance of a Disguised Implant

A cache file identified as `fix_master.Py` in the metadata uses a pseudo-terminal to establish an SSH connection to CS2-K8S-MASTER as the root user. It is programmed to disable SSH host key verification, wait for a password prompt, and then submit a hard-coded password.

The command execution performed remotely performs the following actions:

- Identify the executable file referenced by a specific PID
- Search for the `docker-proxy-helper` process
- Terminate the existing process
- Run /usr/libexec/docker/docker-proxy-helper in isolation using `nohup`
- Check the process list through which the process was restarted to determine if the process has been restarted

This strongly supports the assumption that the operator had obtained potential credentials for

the root account and that an unauthorized or malicious binary, disguised as a Docker infrastructure component, was running in that Path. The fact that the PID and file path were specifically designated increases the likelihood of prior access or observation. However, since no actual SSH execution logs remain, it is not possible to confirm whether authentication or process restart was successful.

The password value has been omitted from this report. Given the possibility that the same credentials were reused on other systems, they should be treated as compromised credentials.

B.3 JVM Heap Credential Mining

The cache file identified as `extract_hprof.Py` in the metadata opens `/tmp/reg.Hprof` and sequentially extracts printable strings. It then searches for configuration keys and password-like values associated with Redis, data sources, RabbitMQ, Access Keys, Secret Keys, AES-related values, Private Keys, and more, and outputs the number of detections for each item along with surrounding strings.

The target file path is highly correlated with the Spring Actuator Heap Dump endpoints identified multiple times in the scan results. Combining these two sets of data, it is highly likely that a workflow existed involving the identification of exposed Heap Dump endpoints, the acquisition of Heap Dump files, storage in a temporary path, and automated secret extraction.

However, the currently available data does not include actual Heap Dump files or extraction results. Therefore, it remains unconfirmed whether credentials or encryption information were actually obtained.

B.4 Java Download

P.Class is a Java 8 class that calls `/bin/sh -c` in its static initializer. The embedded command downloads “ljy-bank-channel” from port 3000 on the CS2-C2 server to /tmp/.Gw, grants it execution permissions, and then runs it in a sandboxed environment using `setsid` to block input and output.
Since this behavior is embedded in the static initializer, the command execution is designed to occur at the time the class is initialized. While this demonstrates the downloader’s operational mechanism and its connection to the C2 infrastructure, it has not been confirmed whether this class was actually initialized within a vulnerable Java application.

B.5 Rust Implant

Ljy-bank-channel and tcp_linux_amd64 are x86-64 Linux PIE executables of the same file size. The two files differ by exactly 128 bytes in a single contiguous region, while the C2 address, TCP port 6666, key format, protocol-related strings, libraries, and function strings are mostly identical. The modified sections may contain build-specific settings or encryption-related data, but their exact purpose has not been confirmed.

As follows, the following broad range of implant functions has been identified in the static strings:

- Execution of commands and script execution
- File upload and download
- Viewing and terminating processes
- Copying, moving, and deleting files
- Self-deletion
- SOCKS5 proxy, forwarding, hop, and tunnel features
- Screenshot and Screen Resolution Collection
- Collecting system information, uptime, CPU, mouse, and virtualization environment data
- Encrypted/TLS-based communication and chunked transfer
- ELF payload execution

The Rust build path references a crate mirror operated by a university located in China. This is merely a trace left by the build environment and cannot be used as evidence to determine the operator's nationality or location.

B.6 Windows Implant Disguised as a Region and Language Settings Utility

LocaleMgr.Exe is an unsigned x86-64 Windows PE file. Based on its Chinese metadata, it is disguised as a utility for managing system locale, language, and format settings. However, the actual file contents do not match such a description. It contains the same CS2-C2, TCP 6666 settings, and key data as the Rust-based Linux implant, and the PDB path to tcp_implant.Pdb is also confirmed.

Static strings reveal evidence that features common to the Linux implant have been adapted for the Windows environment. The main functions are as follows:

- Command execution
- Execution of non-interactive PowerShell with Execution Policy bypass

- Temporary script cleanup
- File upload and download
- Execution of inline PE or shellcode
- Process and Module Manipulation
- Using Named Pipes
- Screenshot and Input Control
- Checking System and BIOS-Based Virtualization Environments
- Impersonation
- Manipulation of Services, Processes, and Files
- SOCKS and Tunneling Capabilities
- Self-deletion

Process memory manipulation and Remote Thread-related APIs were identified in some strings. This is static evidence indicating that these features are implemented or that related code is linked; however, it does not necessarily mean that actual process injection was performed in this case.

B.7 Go-Based Linux Implant

Linux1 is an x86-64 Go executable and is a separate implant from the Rust-based implants identified earlier. It contains a separate long key for the CS2-C2 server on TCP port 4444. Analysis of static strings reveals capabilities for executing a shell, WebSocket/TLS communication, SOCKS proxy, screenshot collection using X11 and display-related functions, system information gathering, file creation, and searching for patterns of sensitive information or credentials.

A comparison with publicly available data based on characteristic strings, file hashes, and configuration values revealed no reliable information identifying an existing malware family. Therefore, it is currently most reasonable to classify this as a custom or proprietary Go-based Linux implant.

B.8 Reverse Multiplexed SOCKS Worker

Mux.Py and mux2.Py are Python-based reverse proxy workers. Both scripts establish an external connection to a CS2-C2 server and transmit a WK marker, using a custom 5-byte !BHH-formatted frame consisting of a command, connection ID, and payload length. They can also

process SOCKS CONNECT requests targeting arbitrary IPv4 addresses or domains.

The first worker uses TCP port 1081. The second worker uses TCP port 1080 by default and includes TCP Keepalive, Heartbeat, and automatic reconnection features.

This script can be used to turn an internal system into a SOCKS pivot node that the operator can continuously control.

4. Copy Cat Emerges: Derivative Distributions and the REAPER Case

*Reference date: 2026-10-14

Since the ARTEX main GitHub repository was taken down, we have observed a gradual increase in the number of distributions that are either operated independently based on the original ARTEX codebase or have been customized separately. Some of these are operated with the product name, user interface, file system structure, and peripheral features modified, while retaining traces of ARTEX. Accordingly, we continuously tracked and analyzed how ARTEX is being reused, modified, and redistributed now that the original repository is no longer available.

One particularly notable example among these is an instance believed to have been customized by users from Russia. This distribution used a separate brand name instead of the original "ARTEX" and incorporated Russian-language product terminology and its own runtime structure. However, traces referencing ARTEX components continued to be found within internal artifacts. Taken together, this suggests that rather than a simple, unmodified distribution of the original ARTEX, it is highly likely to be an implementation that was separately modified or forked based on the existing ARTEX codebase.

Further analysis of source code artifacts exposed in the same environment revealed that the backend code contained a significant number of Korean strings. These strings were found in Go source files responsible for SMTP functionality, note handling, and HTTP requests; they included Korean expressions such as SMTP authentication and TLS error messages, messages related to request and redirect handling, and notes indicating severity and status values.

Such Korean strings alone are not sufficient to conclude that the operator or developer is Korean. It is entirely possible that they resulted from the reuse of existing code, localization efforts, or the inclusion of components imported from other projects. However, the fact that such traces of multilingual code were found alongside Russian-based branding indicates that the ARTEX derivative distribution goes beyond a simple name change—its functionality and code structure themselves are being modified and restructured.

A. The Birth of Copy Cat

Some instances retained the ARTEX name while only partially changing the language, while others used completely different product names such as ScopeWeaver, Tangora PTaaS, Horda, Meze, AegisLoop, and Bob Research Labs.

Based on the identified titles, it appears that ARTEX is not limited to use solely within the original project but is being redistributed by various independent operators and modified to suit their respective environments. While some distributions continue to prominently feature autonomous penetration testing capabilities as before, other instances have restructured the same or similar underlying platforms into forms such as security assessments, code audits, and general-purpose agent systems.

Below are the main names identified in distribution instances believed to be ARTEX derivatives or based on ARTEX.

ARTEX — 自主渗透测试控制台
ARTEX — Autonomous penetration testing console
Bob Research Labs: автономная система исследования безопасности
AegisLoop — 攻防安全运营
jins 시스템 — 취약점 점검 시스템
Autonomous Pentest Agent — 自主渗透测试控制台
ARTEX — Autonomous security assessment console
ARTEX — Autonomous Pentest Console
CodeAudit — 自主代码审计平台
AgentHub — 通用智能体平台
索隐（SUOYIN）
ARTEX: 자율 침투 테스트 콘솔
ScopeWeaver — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console
ARTEX — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console
Ayven
LOMCS — 自主安全检测控制台
ARTEX — 自主滲透測試控制台
EXMAICAI
Tangora PTaaS — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console

Horda — Autonomous Penetration Testing Console
ARTEX — 자율 침투 테스트 콘솔
ARTEX: Autonomous Penetration Testing Console
ARTEX: Autonomous penetration testing console
Bob Research Labs: We're coming to root your server!
Meze — 자율 침투 테스트 콘솔
ARTEX — 自律型ペネトレーションテスト管理画面
安全渗透智能体
Algogen
Uchange — 自主渗透测试控制台
Catchya-ART — 自主渗透测试控制台
秋水ARTEX — 自主渗透测试控制台
ARTEX — Console de teste de penetração autônomo
ARTEX — консоль автономного пентеста
GaSSpEr Ghost — Console de pentest autonome
WETEX
ARTEX — 自律型ペネトレーションテストコンソール
ARTEX : console de pentest autonome
ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Console
ARTEX Plus: Offensive, Defensive & Closed-loop Security
ARTEX
ARTEX — Console de Teste de Penetração Autônomo
ARTEX — the autonomous penetration-testing console
ARTEX — Консоль автономного тестирования на проникновение
GPT-RACK
IR 排查控制台
RAIM: 자율 침투 테스트 콘솔
RedWolf — 对话式渗透测试控制台
鲸鱼红队渗透系统 — 红队渗透测试控制台

B. Case Study: “Grim Reaper”




Figure 3. “The Grim Reaper” Login Screen

Among the ARTEX-derived distributions identified during monitoring, a particularly noteworthy example is an instance named “THE GRIM REAPER.” The interface listed Bob Research Labs as the operator. The custom interface exposed on TCP port 3001 introduced the platform as an “Autonomous offensive security framework” and featured the phrase “We are coming to root your server.” Meanwhile, on a separate HTTPS service running on TCP port 443, the original ARTEX login screen remained, but the HTML title had been changed to “Bob Research Labs: We’re coming to root your server!”
Considering that the original ARTEX interface and a front-end with separate branding were operating simultaneously, it is judged that this was not a simple deployment of the original ARTEX, but rather a customization of the external interface and branding while retaining the underlying application.

Further analysis of the exposed files and runtime logs provided additional evidence confirming that this deployment was built on the ARTEX codebase. References to “artex-linux-amd64” were consistently found in the internal filesystem paths, and within the customized environment, the project name had been changed to “reaper-full.” Furthermore, the system retained ARTEX’s worker structure and traffic logging proxy while incorporating separate branding and

configuration structures.



Figure 4. Partial contents of Open Directory

B.1 Reaper Log

Further analysis of the runtime logs confirmed that the REAPER distribution retains ARTEX's existing multi-agent orchestration structure intact. The backend restored the task status stored in PostgreSQL, reassigned uncompleted Intents after restarting, and distributed tasks in parallel to up to three Workers by calling the Planner whenever new dependencies were created. The results of completed Intents were recorded back into the task status in the form of structured Fact, Asset, and vulnerability information.

The logs also revealed evidence that multiple LLM profiles were actually in use. Configurations based on DeepSeek, GLM, Kimi, and Claude were set up together, demonstrating that this custom platform was extended to allow for the selective use of multiple LLM backends rather than relying on a single model provider. In addition, a separate "bobresearch" agent profile was identified, suggesting that the operator did not merely change the interface and product name but directly modified ARTEX's internal settings and agent configuration.



Figure 5. Models in Use

B.2 translate_go.py

Additional source code artifacts revealed that Bob Research Labs operators directly modified the ARTEX codebase and performed localization work. A script named `translate_go.Py` contained hard-coded mappings to replace Korean and Chinese strings—found in various backend components such as authentication, asset management, chat references, file uploading, task constraints, and conversation management—with English. Furthermore, ARTEX instructions for operators—including those for using the Interactive Shell, msfconsole, SSH, the database REPL, and the Reverse Shell—were configured to be translated into English.

Furthermore, considering the discovery of the `artex-ko` directory and numerous Korean localization artifacts, it is presumed that the customized REAPER build was based on certain components of a Korean-localized variant of ARTEX, which were subsequently re-localized into English. The Russian-language branding found in the deployment environment suggests the possibility of operations targeting users from Russia or users in Russian-speaking regions; however, the operator's nationality cannot be determined based on the current data alone. Similarly, the English translation work is more reasonably interpreted as an internationalization effort to enable the platform to be used in a multilingual environment, rather than as an indication that English-speaking victims were the target.

B.3 Exploitation of CVE-2026-75650, CVSS 10.0

A working copy of StyleSmuggler, a publicly available PoC for CVE-2026-75650, was exposed in the Bob Research Labs environment. This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw in Magento/Adobe Commerce that can be exploited without authentication. The local directory retained the original repository structure intact, including exploit.Py, curl_failed_payment.Sh,

failed-payment-request.Json, Docker-related files, and .Git metadata. The execution logs revealed an attack trace that showed the multi-stage attack procedure identical to the publicly available PoC had been carried out against multiple internet-exposed Magento systems. Key steps included creating a Guest Cart, manipulating billing information, triggering a vulnerable payment processing flow, and extracting the Magento Report Identifier.

However, the workflow observed in the local environment goes beyond the typical RCE verification level of the original PoC. In one execution log, an "IRC BOT DEPLOYED" message was output, along with a record indicating that a PHP payload named `cache.Php` had been generated and instructions to check for the newly connected bot on IRC. In a separate `test_new_bot.Php` file, code was also found configured to download the `irc.Php` payload from the GitHub repository `Bob-Marley-Backup/LAB-Uncomplete` and execute it immediately.

Analysis of the obtained irc.Php file confirmed that it was not merely a simple test marker, but a fully functional, persistence-based IRC C2 implant. The bot was configured to connect to 152.89.170.207:6667 And join the password-protected #mg_master channel. It also generates a unique nickname for each host and transmits information such as the compromised domain, server IP, PHP version, operating system, and the user under which it is running.

The implant was designed to ensure persistence by copying itself to multiple hiding paths and creating cron jobs that run periodically or upon system reboot. It also included a mechanism to delete the initial drop file once installation was successful. Command execution supported various PHP execution methods, including proc_open, popen, shell_exec, exec, system, and passthru, and was implemented to increase the likelihood of operation even in environments where certain functions were restricted.

After establishing an IRC connection, it receives arbitrary commands in the format !Cmd@<BOT> <COMMAND> and !Cmd@all <COMMAND>, and returns the execution results to the channel. In addition, it provides functions to query the host list and check system information through the !List and !Info commands.

Taking such artifacts into account, the Bob Research Labs environment went beyond simply hosting publicly available CVE PoCs. It is believed that a follow-up attack flow was in place to deploy and execute an IRC-controlled PHP implant with persistence following an RCE exploit

based on StyleSmuggler. However, based on the current data alone, it remains unclear whether this workflow was executed directly by REAPER/ARTEX or whether it was a separate attack capability development or experiment conducted on the same system.

B.4 Skills

A significantly expanded collection of Agent Skills, compared to typical ARTEX deployments, was identified in the Bob Research Labs environment. These Skills consist of reusable guidelines and testing methodologies that the agent can load and use as needed; they serve to expand the scope of security operations the platform can perform without modifying the core application itself.

The identified Skills covered a broad spectrum of offensive and defensive security, including API reconnaissance and testing, SQL injection, SSRF, XSS, XXE, IDOR, command injection, file upload testing, cloud and container security, mobile application testing, network penetration testing, secure code reviews, incident response, and vulnerability assessments. While some core ARTEX components—such as api-recon, playwright-cli, and scopesentry—remained unchanged, most of the additional modules identified were found not to be included in the standard ARTEX Skills set.

In addition, related artifacts such as skills-en-keep, skills-backup, skills-translated-en.zip, and bob-research-skills-en.zip were identified, indicating that the operator continuously collected, translated, curated, and repackaged Skills for use in a customized environment. The kairos-strike-eino-demo package is believed to be evidence of experimentation with a separate agent-Skill integration method. However, the available material is insufficient to conclude that all of these modules were independently developed by Bob Research Labs. The collection is likely a mixture of public security playbooks, translated modules, and locally modified components.




Figure 6. Custom Skills

5. Summary and Conclusion of Infrastructure Tracking

Through infrastructure pivoting, ASEC identified approximately 600 additional IP addresses hosting ARTEX, and CyberStrikeAI was also running on some of these systems. Both tools are publicly available open-source projects that can be freely deployed by unrelated users. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the entire identified infrastructure is operated by a single threat actor or a specific campaign.

Analysis of exposed web services showed that many systems operated a range of applications alongside ARTEX, including AI API gateways, attack surface management (ASM) platforms, penetration testing tools, and C2 frameworks. Sub2API was frequently identified, and security tools including Scope Sentry, ARL-Next, LunaFox, and CyberStrikeAI were also found. Numerous infrastructure management platforms, educational services, commercial applications, and general web services with no confirmed direct connection to ARTEX were also identified. Some systems may be operated by security researchers or penetration testers, or may be multipurpose servers or shared infrastructure.

The two cases involving operational directories exposed to the internet contained material related to follow-up attack activities, including credential use, internal network reconnaissance, pivoting, payload delivery, C2 communication, and implant operation. The collected material is consistent with attack activity targeting actual systems or systems configured to resemble real

environments rather than a simple proof of concept or functional test.

However, no evidence was found to attribute these activities to the ARTEX developers or to classify the two cases as a single campaign. The exposure of ARTEX and operational files on the same system should be interpreted only as an association identified during infrastructure tracking and collection. The available material is insufficient to determine whether the cases share an operator, an operational objective, or an organization.

In both cases, scripts, credentials, internal IP information, C2 configurations, implant binaries, and follow-up attack tools remained on systems exposed to the internet. While this material provides useful detection and hunting information for defenders, it also creates a secondary risk by exposing attack methods and reusable access information to third parties.

After the original ARTEX repository was no longer publicly accessible, independently operated or separately branded distributions continued to increase. The identified instances use interfaces in Korean, Russian, Japanese, French, English, and Chinese. Many retain ARTEX's core components while modifying the product name, language, agent settings, and supporting functions.

The Bob Research Labs distribution is one such case. Alongside a customized ARTEX/REAPER build, the environment contained additional Skills, multiple LLM backends, exploit development artifacts, and a workflow that used CVE-2026-75650 to deploy an IRC-controlled PHP implant. Source code, credentials, development artifacts, runtime logs, and attack tools were also extensively exposed through internet-accessible directories.

The way this distribution was operated suggests poor operational security (OPSEC) and little concern about external exposure. However, these characteristics alone do not establish that the operators were hacktivists or low-skilled attackers. The combination of aggressive branding and repeated OPSEC failures is more consistent with experimental operations, loosely organized attack activity, or relatively immature tactics, techniques, and procedures than with a carefully concealed operation.

ARTEX combines LLM-based planning, reusable security Skills, automated tool execution, and multi-agent orchestration. The continued development and release of such frameworks is likely

to lower the technical barrier to entry for attack activity. AI-based offensive security tools do not completely replace the expertise, infrastructure, initial access, or operator judgment required for sophisticated incidents, but they can substantially reduce the manual work and expertise required at individual stages of an attack.

These capabilities can also be used for legitimate security assessments. However, when public code is copied, localized, extended, and combined with public exploits and follow-up attack tools, the same automation capabilities can be redirected toward attacks. Continued observation of cases in which tools such as ARTEX are used in actual attack activity is therefore needed.

Part 2. Analysis of ARTEX Penetration Test Results

When a user specifies a goal and acceptable parameters, multiple agents divide the tasks among themselves and use the identified assets and facts to inform subsequent decisions. Therefore, to understand ARTEX, it is important to examine what information the agents collect and share and how they use it to determine their next actions, rather than simply whether individual commands are automated.

Part 2 describes the confirmation of web shell upload and program execution on a web server with a file upload vulnerability, and the reproduction of initial intrusion and lateral movement in an environment simulating the initial access conditions of the Apache ActiveMQ incident published by The DFIR Report.

1. ARTEX Architecture and Key Functions

A. Architecture and Execution Flow

The ARTEX web UI serves as the portal through which users register assets and tasks, configure LLM connections, and monitor progress and results. The server manages the execution status of tasks and agents. Assets discovered by agents and task processes are stored in PostgreSQL, and some communications between the tools used by workers and their targets are tracked via a logging proxy. The official architecture consists of a web interface, server, task engine, agents, database, and authorization and traffic logging functions.




Figure 7. ARTEX Operation Flow and Agent Configuration (ChatGPT)

A key feature of the ARTEX architecture is that it manages the asset graph and the exploration graph separately. The asset graph stores the structure of targets—such as domains, IP addresses, Services, applications, and endpoints—and is shared by multiple tasks. The exploration graph stores connections between a specific task's objectives, attempted approaches, verified facts, and discovered vulnerabilities. Through the connection information between the two graphs, it is possible to trace which specific judgments were based on which assets and observation results. This structure helps reduce redundant exploration and facilitates the verification of test scope and progress for each asset.

B. Agent Role Groups and Key Functions

Eight agents are registered by default on the ARTEX agent management screen. Agents can be broadly categorized into three groups based on their roles and execution workflows: a group that performs automated penetration testing, a group that processes user requests, and a group that documents or revalidates results.

Role Groups	Agent	Tasks Performed
Autonomous Task Pipeline	Goals, Planner, Worker	Responsible for the workflow from setting goals to determining the search direction and executing tools

Role Groups	Agent	Tasks Performed
User Intervention and Autonomous Execution	Mainagent, Auto, Pentest	Incorporates user instructions into tasks or performs tasks directly through a separate dialogue
Documentation and revalidation of results	Reporter, Retester	Compiles identified findings into a report and re-verifies whether corrections have been made

Table 2. Role Groups by Execution Flow

The default prompt can be modified in the agent management screen, and information such as task objectives and graph status is added according to the role during execution.

C. Autonomous Task Pipeline

When an Attack Target and objectives are provided to ARTEX, the Goals, Planner, and Worker modules directly participate in the automated penetration testing workflow. Goals defines the final results and test scope; Planner determines the next exploration direction; and Worker executes tools and records the results. When the graph is updated based on the Worker's records, Planner reassesses the next direction. An analysis of each agent's default prompt and behavior is as follows.

Agent	Purpose	Constraints	Goal	Decomposition Principle
Goals	Organize user requests into final goals and test scope	Reflect only the specified conditions; prohibit arbitrary expansion of the scope	Record the final goals, permitted and prohibited conditions, and scope of assets	Isolate only independent final outcomes; exclude reconnaissance and verification from the objectives
Worker	Execute the assigned test procedures using tools and verify responses	Must comply with the approved scope; reporting vulnerabilities without evidence of reproducibility is prohibited	Record new assets, observations, and reproduced vulnerabilities	Focus on a single assigned intent and isolate only independent results
Planner	Determine the next testing direction based on current exploration	Make decisions based on evidence and avoid duplication with ongoing work	Determine whether the goal has been achieved or assign a new exploration intent	Assign independent paths in parallel; assign paths requiring prior results sequentially

Agent	Purpose	Constraints	Goal	Decomposition Principle
	results			

Table 3. Roles in the Autonomous Task Pipeline Agent: Prompt Analysis

D. User Intervention and Independent Execution

MainAgent interacts with the user within the current task to check progress and incorporate instructions into the task. If the user adds a goal or changes the scope, MainAgent registers that information as a goal or constraint and immediately passes tasks requiring immediate verification to the Worker as an intent. In other words, MainAgent serves as an interface through which the user can check the progress of ongoing tasks or issue direct instructions.

Auto handles ARTEX's operational functions—such as task creation, status checks, pausing, and managing skills and tools—within the dialogue screen. It does not plan the next Attack Stage for a specific penetration test; rather, it routes the user's platform management requests to the appropriate functions.

In the case of a penetration test, it is a standalone testing method where a single agent proceeds through the exploration plan, tool execution, and result verification in a separate conversation. This differs from the autonomous workflow where roles are separated into Goals, Planner, and Worker; instead, it manages the test direction and evidence within a single conversation.

E. Results Documentation and Revalidation

The Reporter reviews the findings and related evidence logged by the Worker to create a vulnerability report containing reproduction procedures, impact, rationale, and remediation recommendations. Report creation is the stage of organizing recorded findings into a human-readable deliverable; it is not a stage for exploring new testing directions.

When a user initiates the re-verification of a specific finding, the Retester compares the existing reproduction conditions with the current response in a separate session. The Retester records one of the following outcomes—reproduction, confirmation of fix, or inability to verify—along with the rationale for the determination, without having to repeat the entire Initial Intrusion process.

F. Default Skills and Tools

The ARTEX repository contains three basic Skills. Skills serve as procedures and guides that agents refer to when performing tasks; they do not include functionality for directly interacting with actual target systems. On the Skills screen in the web interface, you can view content and usage history and configure visibility settings for each agent.

Basic Skills	Provided Guidelines	Applicable Targets and Conditions
Api-recon	Analyze front-end code and requests in progress to identify API paths, methods, and parameters	Surveys the API surface of web applications
Playwright-cli	How to use commands to inspect and manipulate page elements in the browser	Web targets requiring browser interaction
ScopeSentry	How to View Assets and Tasks via the ScopeSentry MCP	Requires connecting a separate ScopeSentry instance to the MCP

Table 4. Skills Included in the Default Configuration

Tools are functions that agents can invoke to perform command execution or view and modify ARTEX records. The Tools screen in the web interface distinguishes between system tools and custom tools as follows.

Tool Type	Main Functions
System Tools	Execution and log management functions provided by ARTEX by default
Custom Shell	Exposes commands in the execution environment to the agent
Custom Commands	Registered command templates execution
Custom script	Python code execution
Custom HTTP	Send an API request

Table 5. Tool Types and Key Functions

System tools allow you to manage descriptions, default parameter values, activation status, and agent connections. Custom tools allow you to configure input parameters and execution details, and verify behavior through test runs. In v0.3.15, If the output from MCP tools or custom tools becomes too long, it is passed to the model within the session-specific output limit; if a separate

output Path is specified, the entire content is saved to a file. The behavior an agent can perform is influenced not only by prompts but also by the scope of the connected Skills and tools.

In addition, ARTEX provides ScopeSentry asset synchronization, tool execution approval and blocking, and a logging proxy. Assets imported from ScopeSentry can be linked to the scope of work and the asset graph. Traffic collected via the logging proxy can be searched or filtered in the v0.3.15 Web interface by response content, request path, status code, and response length, which helps identify requests and responses for specific test behaviors.

A default rule that identifies API paths involving deletion operations has been added to the tool execution blocking feature. This rule blocks requests if the tool input contains paths such as /delete or /remove, even if the HTTP method is GET or POST; ARTEX system administrators can modify or disable this rule on the command execution screen. If the model is configured to review tool calls not evaluated by the rules, the tokens used in that review can also be checked separately.

ARTEX invokes the selected tool within the execution environment. The network requests or process executions observed on the target vary depending on the tool selected by the agent and the test objective. The defense side analyzes both the characteristics of requests by function and the sequence of exploration flows together.

2. ARTEX Penetration Test Configuration

A. LLM Connection Profile Configuration

When creating a new connection profile in the LLM menu on the web, enter the profile name, API format, model identifier, and API key. If you check the list of formats (API formats) labeled “Format,” you will see Anthropic, OpenAI (Chat Completions), and OpenAI (Responses API); these options determine the format of the requests and responses that ARTEX exchanges with the LLM Service.

Even if “Anthropic” or “OpenAI” is listed as the API format, this does not necessarily mean you are limited to using only that company’s models. If the API for the model you wish to use is compatible with one of these three formats, you can connect by manually entering the model identifier and Base URL. If you are using a separate proxy server, you can configure the Base

URL and, if necessary, a proxy for LLM requests.




Figure 8. LLM Configuration Profile Screen

This is the profile screen where you can configure settings when connecting a new LLM. At the very top, you can set the name (名称) and format (格式), and below that, you specify the actual model to be used by entering the model identifier and Base URL.

In the “Custom Session Header” field, enter the name of the HTTP header to be included in the request, rather than the header value itself. For example, enter this name for connections that require the `x-opencode-session` header, such as OpenCode Zen. ARTEX automatically populates the header value with the session ID of the current conversation or Worker execution for each LLM request. Since the same ID is used for multiple requests within the same session and a different ID is used for different sessions, this allows integration with gateways that manage session-specific caching or request paths. If this field is left blank, no separate session header is sent.



Figure 9. LLM Connection Test and Model Selection

After entering the format, Base URL, and API Key, click the refresh button next to the “Model” field to run a connection test. If the connection is established successfully, you will see a list of available models from which you can select the one you wish to use.

In the Profile section, you can adjust the request limits per minute and per second, context size, maximum number of tokens allowed per response, streaming settings, and the model’s inference settings. Since the supported request fields vary by format, the connection test verifies that the selected API format, model, inference settings, and streaming method are configured correctly.



Figure 10. Verification and Activation of an Added LLM

Once you have completed the settings and added the LLM, you can view it in a card-style list, as shown in Figure 10. The LLM is not automatically activated when you save the profile; to use the added model, you must separately click the “Activate” button on the saved profile card.



Figure 11. Function to Specify the Default Model for Each Agent

After registering an LLM profile, you can specify a "Default Model (LLM Configuration)" for each agent individually in the Agent Management screen. If you link a profile to a specific agent, that setting takes precedence over the profile selected for a task or conversation. If a profile is not pinned to an agent, the agent follows the profile specified in the task or conversation; if none is specified, it uses the globally active profile. You can also assign different models to the built-in Goals, Planner, and Worker agents.

ARTEX also supports passing ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or OPENAI_API_KEY via environment variables. When documenting actual test results, you must record the ARTEX version used, the format and model identifier of the connected profile, whether a model is linked to each agent, and the profile specified in the task so that you can verify which LLM was used to perform the test.

B. Creating a Penetration Session (Task) and Defining Its Scope

You can create a penetration testing session (task) on the "Tasks" page in the ARTEX menu; on this management screen, enter a description and the objectives for the new task. You can specify the task name and category as needed, and there are also options to link to existing tasks or companies. When an organization is linked, existing assets registered with that organization are included in the task's test assets, and related domains, IP addresses, and other information are transmitted to the agent as scope information.




Figure 12. Penetration Session (Task) Creation Screen

The key input fields on the task creation screen are the description—which details the test subject and background—and the objective—which specifies the desired outcome. The task name and category are optional, and the system also provides functionality to link to existing tasks or companies. For tasks linked to an organization, that organization's existing assets are included as test assets, and related domains, IP addresses, and other information are transmitted to the agent as scope information.

The asset scope for each job is defined by block rules and allow rules. Assets that match the block rules are excluded from the test scope, and if allow rules are set, only those assets that match the allow rules among the unblocked assets can be tested. On the same screen, you can select the LLM configuration chain to be used for the job in sequence. The first profile is used by default, and if a clear shortage of usage limits occurs, the system switches to the next profile. In the advanced settings, you can also adjust the job time limit and the Planner's periodic execution interval.

3. ARTEX Penetration Test #1: Web Server Intrusion Through a File Upload Vulnerability

A. Test Environment Setup

To test web server penetration through a file upload vulnerability, we installed XAMPP (Apache and PHP) on Windows 11 (192.168.183.128) And built a web page that provides only file upload functionality. The upload code was written to save files to the /uploads path without checking file extensions or formats. Both the Ubuntu 26.04 (192.168.183.189) System running ARTEX and the target web server were placed on the same NAT network.




Figure 13. Diagram of the file upload vulnerability Test Environment (ChatGPT)

We used ARTEX v0.3.14 And connected it to a local Qwen model running on a separate machine. The scope of the operation was limited to a single IP address on the target server, and only registered Qwen inference requests were explicitly allowed as exceptions in the 172 subnet. The operation instructions specified that vulnerabilities must be verified using directly observed evidence, and that calc.Exe should be executed only once to leave evidence if remote code execution was demonstrated. No specific vulnerabilities, input points, or testing techniques were provided; instead, ARTEX was instructed to conduct the investigation and verification following the Goals → Planner → Worker workflow.

B. ARTEX Penetration Process and Results

The session objective was to investigate a web service running on Windows 11 (192.168.183.128) And determine whether initial access was possible via identified vulnerabilities. The operational conditions were as follows.




Figure 14. Penetration Test Task Instructions

Once the task began, the Planner formulated an exploration plan based on the specified objectives, scope, and constraints, and generated "Intents"—the specific tasks to be performed. The Planner then assigned each task to a Worker, reviewed the investigation results recorded by the Worker, and determined the next steps.




Figure 15. Exploration Plan Developed by the Planner Based on User Input

The Worker scanned the target server's ports and accessed web pages to gather information. The target web page featured a single file upload function. The server-side PHP code was written to store uploaded files in the /uploads directory after removing only the Path components from the file name, without checking the file extension or format. ARTEX recorded the results of the port and web page investigations and proceeded with follow-up tasks.




Figure 16. Command Execution via the Worker

Through repeated planning and execution, ARTEX used the file upload feature to upload a web shell and execute a calculator program on the target server. The user did not provide step-by-step instructions regarding the upload path or how to use the web shell. ARTEX determined the next steps based on its investigation findings and successfully achieved its goal of executing a program on the web server.



Figure 17. Inference Flowchart of the Penetration Process

Separate from the web service reconnaissance, when an SMB port was identified during the

nmap scan, ARTEX was observed to automatically install and use Impacket to check for vulnerabilities in that service.



Figure 18. Automatic installation of Impacket for SMB service assessment

During this penetration testing session, ARTEX repeatedly conducted target reconnaissance, formulated exploration plans, and executed tools without having been provided any prior information regarding vulnerabilities or testing techniques. Ultimately, it was confirmed that ARTEX successfully uploaded a web shell by using a file upload vulnerability and executing a program on the target server—all without any user intervention.

4. ARTEX Penetration Test #2: ApacheMQ Intrusion Based on a DFIR Report

A. Test Environment Setup

The Test Environment was configured based on the initial access scenario described in the Apache ActiveMQ breach case study published by The DFIR Report. To reproduce the externally exposed OpenWire Service—identified as the attack entry point in the original attack case—and

CVE-2023-46604, the ARTEX execution system was isolated from the internal network containing the penetration test target. Additionally, an execution environment configured with ARTEX's default settings was prepared, and the test was initiated using non-expert-level prompts.




Figure 19. ARTEX Test Environment Diagram (ChatGPT)

ARTEX was run on Kali Linux, using the IP address 192.168.189.139 Within the NAT range. The ARTEX agent and tools retained their default settings, and the LLM used the glm-5.2 Model provided by OpenCode. The reasons for selecting this Service and model are as follows.

- While services such as ChatGPT and Claude may reject identical attack-related requests based on security policies, OpenCode allows testing with requests related to penetration testing, attacks, and vulnerability analysis.
- OpenCode offers a variety of models; among them, glm-5.2 Was selected because it was deemed to offer a cost-performance ratio suitable for use by threat actors

The external exposure conditions of the original case were simulated using pfSense, which was deployed between the NAT segment and the host-only segment of the test network. The access point visible from the NAT segment is the pfSense address 192.168.189.138; Only connections incoming to TCP port 61616 on this address were configured to be forwarded to the ActiveMQ server at 192.168.100.20 On port 61616. Through this setup, ARTEX replicated the

conditions where users access the OpenWire Service through pfSense's exposed address and port, rather than connecting directly to the target server's internal address. Additionally, the pfSense firewall did not allow connections to any other ports and restricted access to other internal servers in the 192.168.100.X range, such as the ActiveMQ server.




Figure 20. ActiveMQ Penetration Testing Session

B. ARTEX Penetration Process and Results

The prompts regarding the description and objectives entered for the session (task) are as follows.

- Description: Penetrate the target at 192.168.189.138 And perform lateral movement within the internal network
- Objective: After penetrating the target at 192.168.189.138, Perform lateral movement if there are accessible targets within the internal network.

After the session was created, Planner first conducted a comprehensive TCP port scan and a UDP port scan to identify services accessible from the outside. The UDP port scan did not identify any Services that could be exploited for penetration, but the comprehensive TCP port scan revealed that only one port—port 61616—was open. An OpenWire response and version information indicating "Apache ActiveMQ 5.15.15" Were obtained from that port. Consequently, the Planner designated the externally exposed ActiveMQ as the target for initial access and

proceeded with the operation, focusing on CVE-2023-46604, which affects that version.




Figure 21. Identification of the Apache ActiveMQ Service and Selection of the Attack Path

ARTEX constructed an OpenWire test message based on publicly available information regarding CVE-2023-46604 and observed how the target server responded when the message was sent. During repeated testing, it was observed that the target server loaded the XML file prepared by ARTEX. While this indicated that the vulnerability could affect the server's processing workflow, the initial XML file did not result in command execution. ARTEX compared the server's responses to identify the point where execution halted, modified the XML structure accordingly, and subsequently confirmed that the output of commands executed on the target was returned. ARTEX then verified that initial access had been successfully established by exchanging commands via a PowerShell shell and creating test files on the target system.

After confirming the command output, ARTEX exchanged commands with the target system through the PowerShell shell. ARTEX verified the operating system and hostname and created

a test file on the target system to determine whether it could actually achieve System Control beyond merely responding to external requests. As a result, initial access was gained on BEACHHEAD01, a Windows Server 2019 system running ActiveMQ. It took approximately 56 minutes from the start of the session to reach this stage.




Figure 22. Successful exploitation of the ActiveMQ vulnerability and establishment of a reverse shell

Having successfully gained initial access, ARTEX investigated BEACHHEAD01's network configuration and the privileges of the current account in order to perform lateral movement to the internal network, its next target. To determine which network range it was connected to, which internal hosts it could communicate with, and whether it could access other servers using only the compromised account, ARTEX proceeded by first establishing a detailed plan regarding network and account information. ARTEX determined that the compromised BEACHHEAD01 (192.168.100.20) Environment was connected to the internal network in the 192.168.100.X range and that the ActiveMQ service account possessed local administrator privileges. Next, by scanning the internal network, they identified the domain controller DC01 (192.168.100.30), The backup server BACKUP01 (192.168.100.40), The file server FILESVR01 (192.168.100.50), And

Client01 (192.168.100.60).



Figure 23. Internal Asset Information Collected

ARTEX confirmed that it could read the shared folders on FILESVR01 using the ActiveMQ service account. However, determining that these permissions alone were insufficient for remote command execution on the internal servers, ARTEX utilized local administrator privileges on BEACHHEAD01 to collect data containing memory and account information. Analysis resulted in the acquisition of a hash (NT hash) used to authenticate the domain administrator account's password.




Figure 24. Deriving the Plaintext Password Through Hash Cracking

ARTEX performed offline hash cracking on this hash to retrieve the password and verified the result by comparing it with login credentials stored in other formats. Subsequently, using the obtained domain administrator account, ARTEX accessed the remote management service of the internal servers to perform command execution on DC01 and FILESVR01, and also successfully performed remote command execution on BACKUP01 and Client01.




Figure 25. Achievement of the Final Objective (Lateral Movement Within the Internal Network)

During this penetration session, ARTEX completed the entire process—from identifying exposed services to testing ActiveMQ vulnerabilities, gaining initial access, exploring the internal network, obtaining account information, and performing lateral movement. By performing command execution on an externally exposed ActiveMQ server and using it as a springboard, the team successfully executed remote commands on four internal hosts without any user intervention. This demonstrates that simply combining LLM services—which are easily accessible even to those without hacking knowledge—with readily downloadable open-source pipelines allows one to carry out the entire process, from Initial Breach to lateral movement within the internal network, just as a real threat actor would.

5. Analysis of Results

ASEC's testing confirmed that ARTEX scans for publicly exposed services and functions and attempts various attacks targeting environments with inadequate security configurations or

vulnerabilities.

During this process, requests sent directly by ARTEX or through external tools may contain different User-Agent values; however, not all operations generate requests, and this value is absent in non-HTTP communications. Even in HTTP requests, the value may not be recorded or may be altered by the threat actor depending on tool settings or log collection methods; therefore, it is difficult to detect or block ARTEX's activities based solely on a specific User-Agent.

The figure below illustrates the attack flow based on a "file upload attack case" and distinguishes between requests actually observed in the PoC and those identified only in code and documentation.




Figure 26. User-Agents by Function According to the ARTEX Attack Flow

A. Results of User-Agent Analysis by Function

PoC test results showed that different User-Agents were recorded depending on ARTEX's functionality and the tool used to invoke it. "Artex-selfupdate" was observed when the ARTEX execution host checked for updates on GitHub, "norma/0.4" When accessing the Attack Target's web page, and "curl/<VERSION>" when uploading files. Among these, "artex-selfupdate" refers to a request sent to GitHub and therefore does not appear in the access logs of the Attack Target web server. Each value must be verified in the logs of the location where the request was received. For example, "norma/0.4" And "curl/<VERSION>" can be identified if

the target web server, reverse proxy, or WAF logs the request headers.

External tools such as nmap, nxc, and Impacket can be used for network reconnaissance and propagation. When an HTTP request is generated, the User-Agent of each tool may be logged; however, non-HTTP communications do not leave a User-Agent trace. Therefore, to verify related activity, you must examine not only web access logs but also firewall logs, network connection logs, and service access logs. By examining the source and destination IP addresses, access times, and destination ports, you can determine whether connections to other services occurred before or after the web request.

In the ARTEX source code, `artex-enrich/1.0` Is set as the User-Agent, while the reference script for `api-recon` uses `Mozilla/5.0 (Spa-api-recon)` and `Mozilla/5.0 (Spa-api-recon spider)` as User-Agents. However, in the analyzed version of ARTEX, the section calling the artex-enrich functionality was not connected, and the api-recon script was not executed in this PoC. Accordingly, these values should be classified as information that may be logged depending on the functionality or version, rather than traces observed in actual communication.

B. Conclusion

ARTEX divides its targets, determines the next testing direction based on reconnaissance results, and then accesses the target using tools selected by the Worker. Logs from external targets show requests based on the execution tools and Service protocols rather than agent names or information about the connected LLM. Therefore, rather than relying on a single fixed string, it is more appropriate for the defense side to investigate exposed assets and ports and then monitor the flow of testing as it concentrates on specific Services. The User-Agent of certain web features can serve as a supplementary clue when verifying such a flow.

As the use of AI in attack processes increases, open-source tools such as ARTEX are enabling even users with limited expertise to scan exposed assets and attempt intrusions. In this test as well, we observed that the tool reached its target with only minimal user intervention, without any specific guidance on vulnerabilities or attack techniques. ARTEX exploited a file upload vulnerability to execute a calculator program on a web server, and in the ActiveMQ environment, it succeeded in performing remote command execution on four internal hosts after gaining initial access.

As the barrier to entry for AI-powered penetration attempts lowers, the importance of basic security controls grows even greater. To prepare for this, it is necessary to continuously maintain basic security controls—such as minimizing the exposure of unnecessary services, promptly addressing vulnerabilities, managing account privileges according to the principle of least privilege, and restricting access paths to internal networks.

Part 3. The Weak Link Identified by AI: Black October, When the Perimeter Failed

October 2026, referred to as "Black October," saw major cyberattacks and critical vulnerability disclosures in rapid succession. In South Korea and Japan, large-scale data breaches disclosed during this period mostly originated from peripheral entry points such as externally exposed web services, app backend APIs, and outsourced SaaS (services provided by third-party vendors via the cloud, such as email delivery or backup), rather than internal core systems. During the same period, vulnerabilities allowing unauthenticated remote code execution were disclosed one after another in widely used software such as web backend runtimes (e.G., PHP and Node.Js) and GitLab, and there were also numerous reports that AI agents, such as ARTEX, were used in actual breach operations.

In South Korea, starting in late September, a series of breaches swept through the financial sector—beginning with commercial banks and extending to savings banks, finance companies, mutual financial institutions, virtual asset service providers, and insurance companies—while data breaches were also confirmed in the non-financial sector, including corporate accounting software providers, large churches, universities, and franchise chains. In Japan, announcements of personal data breaches ranging from several million to tens of millions of records were made during the same period, and Japanese government agencies identified a method involving the analysis of publicly available apps to attack backend servers as one of the primary causes.

This trend was not limited to these two countries. During the same period, breaches involving outsourced services and externally exposed websites, and large-scale automated attacks using AI agents, were also reported in the United States, Europe, and South America. Most individual incidents remain under investigation, and affected organizations are identified by industry based on public reporting.

1. Incidents in South Korea: A Series of Breaches Beginning in the Financial Sector

Breaches in the Korea financial sector began at commercial banks in late September and spread

across the entire industry over the course of a month. As of October 14, financial authorities had identified 16 financial institutions affected by the breaches, including commercial banks, savings banks, finance companies, mutual financial institutions, electronic financial service providers, online investment-linked financial service providers, and virtual asset service providers; the confirmed scale of personal information leaks was approximately 100,000 records. However, considering the number of affected financial institutions, the scale of the leak is assessed as relatively limited; this suggests the possibility that the incident involved the retrieval of individual records through external access points—such as publicly exposed inquiry services—rather than the theft of a large-scale database (DB) itself. Subsequently, on October 26, a data leak was also reported in the insurance industry.

It is noteworthy that the attack targets were not the banks' core IT systems responsible for processing deposits and transfers. According to the disclosed information, the paths of entry were auxiliary systems attached to the main services—such as inquiry services exclusively for loan brokers, sales support systems for internal employees, and external webpages related to mutual aid programs.

Category	Point of Compromise	Disclosed Information
Commercial Bank A	Inquiry service exclusively for loan brokers	By bypassing standard authentication and repeatedly entering query values, loan-related information for approximately 25,000 people was leaked
Commercial Bank B	Employee Sales Support System (ODS)	Unauthorized access to a system separate from internet and mobile banking led to the leak of information on 89 people
Mutual Finance	External webpage related to mutual aid	Damage was not detected until two days after the attack

Table 6. Major Security Breaches in the Korean Financial Sector and Affected Institutions

In an emergency inspection conducted by financial authorities in early October targeting 555 financial institutions, 130 reported deficiencies. The main deficiencies included failure to apply the latest security patches, poor management of systems no longer receiving technical support, and the lack of a 24-hour monitoring system. It is more accurate to say that the threat actors quickly identified poorly managed peripheral systems rather than employing new techniques.

Traces of ARTEX, an AI-powered automated penetration testing tool, were identified in this attack on the financial sector. The Korean security industry first discovered ARTEX-related

strings on the web server used in the attack, and CrowdStrike obtained ARTEX configuration files and work logs from AI coding tools found in an exposed folder on the threat actor's server. Analysis indicates that the threat actors connected and used several large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek, GLM, and Grok, with ARTEX. However, the threat actors' identities and nationalities have not been confirmed.

Data breaches also continued outside the financial sector during the same period. Although the affected organizations spanned diverse sectors—including enterprise accounting software providers, large churches, coffee franchises, universities, and education districts—the points of compromise were consistently access points outside core business systems, such as employee VPN accounts, external backup solutions, temporary files left in the cloud, portals, and cloud accounts used for training.

Category	Point of Breach	Disclosed Details
Enterprise accounting and ERP software providers	Employee VPN accounts, external backup solutions	Evidence suggests unauthorized access to development servers via VPN accounts and the partial exfiltration of encrypted data through a vulnerability in the backup solution The government has classified this as a major incident and formed a joint public-private investigation team
Large Church	Church information system	Data breach involving the names and dates of birth of approximately 850,000 congregants
Coffee franchise	Temporary data files left on the cloud	Approximately 2.76 Million records leaked during unauthorized access attempts aimed at cryptocurrency mining Caused by temporary files from a past Service overhaul
University	Portal Service	Student ID numbers, contact information, and email addresses of approximately 10,000 current students and alumni were leaked
Office of Education	Cloud accounts for learning	Over 110,000 accounts hacked across six education offices, causing damage

Table 7. Major Data Breach Cases and Points of Compromise in Korea's Non-Financial Sector

Among these, the case involving a corporate accounting and ERP software provider highlights supply chain risks stemming from third-party contractors. Since this company's accounting software is used by more than 110,000 businesses, concerns have been raised that a single

breach could spread to the payroll and tax information of employees at client companies. However, the actual scope of the data breach is still under investigation. The coffee franchise case involved temporary data files created for a past service overhaul that remained in the cloud and were subsequently leaked, illustrating that data past its retention period poses a risk if not properly disposed of.

In late October, a suspect accused of hacking using generative AI was arrested in Korea for the first time. According to police, the ringleader had no formal IT background but taught himself the technology and had prior experience conducting penetration testing at a security firm. This group combined ARTEX with an AI coding agent to carry out Information Theft on approximately 8.2 Million records—including personal information—from about 90 companies in Korea; notably, they attacked 60 of these companies over a 44-day period starting in late August. Police stated that no direct link had been confirmed between this incident and the financial sector incident.

2. Incidents in Japan: The Same Pattern as in South Korea

Japan also saw a concentration of announcements regarding large-scale data breaches during the same period. According to data compiled by the Japanese security firm Marknica, announcements of personal information leaks through web systems operated by Japanese organizations totaled 119 as of October 6, 2026, already surpassing the 84 cases reported for all of 2025 and the 62 cases in 2024; 81 of these occurred after July.

Japanese authorities identified backend attacks through apps as one of the causes. On October 13, the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) analyzed publicly available Android apps to identify the target servers and API structures, then named the method of exploiting server-side vulnerabilities "A2B (App-to-Backend) attacks." The vulnerabilities primarily targeted include SSRF, RCE, SQL injection, and IDOR/BOLA; even if the app itself has no flaws, data leaks can occur if there are vulnerabilities in the server-side API. On October 8, JPCERT/CC also identified the following as major attack types: exploiting existing vulnerabilities, abusing administrative APIs through app analysis, exploiting an SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-72898) in the BI tool Metabase, and installing web shells. However, since neither organization identified specific companies that suffered damage, it is not possible to definitively classify a particular incident as an A2B attack.

Category	Point of Compromise	Disclosed Information

Software Sales	Member Information Query API	The API was misused for four days, potentially leading to the leak of up to approximately 22.52 Million records of member information, including passwords
Major Discount Store	App and Online Store Servers	Unauthorized access gained by exploiting software functions that make up the Service, resulting in the leak of information on up to approximately 1.73 Million people
SaaS Company	API servers for an email-sending SaaS service	Command execution occurred on two API servers, resulting in the export of all subscriber information and the mailing lists of some customers
Japanese subsidiary of a food brand	Outsourced e-commerce platform	A software vulnerability in the outsourced vendor's server was exploited, resulting in the leakage of approximately 3.14 Million records
Department store group	Reservation Site → Customer Management System	Access to the customer management system via the reservation site; approximately 1.26 Million records—nearly the entire membership base using the group's common ID—were leaked
News Platform	Business Management Tool	A vulnerability in the management tool could lead to the leak of approximately 323,000 records, including email addresses
E-book Service	System log files	In addition to 319 records from the member database, up to approximately 4.2 Million records of information remaining in log files were leaked
Securities Firm	Outsourced FAQ System	Possible leak of information on approximately 110,000 people due to a breach of an external Service used for managing inquiries
Cloud Service Provider	Cloud Infrastructure	Ransomware attack caused service disruptions for 495 clients, including local governments and businesses

Table 8. Major Data Breach Cases in Japan and Points of Compromise

In most Japanese cases as well, the point of origin was peripheral systems rather than core systems. In particular, the department store group case involved a single reservation site that led to the group's entire shared ID database, while the e-book service case demonstrated that even if the member database was protected, information could still be leaked if the same data remained in the logs.

ARTEX was also identified in Japan. On October 19, the Japanese security firm GMO Cyber Security by Iera announced that it had detected traces of ARTEX in the attack infrastructure used to attack companies in Korea. Eight of the companies identified by the firm as targets announced data breaches in

September and October. However, the names of these companies were not disclosed, and there is no evidence to suggest they were the work of the same threat actors responsible for the attacks in South Korea. At this point, it has only been confirmed that the same tool was used in both countries.

3. Critical Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Rapid Succession

During the third week of October, serious vulnerabilities in foundational software for the web and infrastructure were disclosed in rapid succession over the course of approximately a few days. Since many of these were components directly exposed to the internet, this further heightened the risk at the perimeter.

Scope	Target	CVE	Impact	Action
Web Runtime	PHP	CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 (CVSS 9.2)	Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (PHP2Shell)	Update to version 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35, Or later. For versions 8.1 And earlier, switch to a supported version Set `session.Upload_progress.Enabled=0` until an official patch is released
Web Runtime	PHP	CVE-2026-115560 (CVSS not disclosed)	Remote code execution under specific session settings	Set `session.Upload_progress.Enabled=0` until an official patch is released
Development Platform	GitLab CE/EE	CVE-2026-110264 (CVSS 10.0)	Unauthenticated remote code execution via a regular expression compiler integer overflow Affects versions starting with GitLab 7.0 (2014)	19.5.1, 19.4.3, 19.3.6, 19.2.9, 19.1.9, 19.0.10, 18.11.13 And later
Server Runtime	Node.Js 22, 24, 26	CVE-2026-111497 (CVSS 9.2)	Remote code execution via Brotli decoder buffer overflow (Node2Shell)	22.23.4, 24.22.1, 26.12.1 And later
DNS	Unbound 1.22.0–1.26.1	CVE-2026-97206 (CVSS 7.5)	Remote Denial of Service when	Version 1.26.2 Or later, or disable DoQ

			using DNS-over-QUIC	
DNS	ISC BIND 9	CVE-2026-19630 and 3 others (CVSS 7.5)	Denial of Service, GSS-TSIG memory corruption (CVE-2026-94300, potential remote code execution)	9.20.30, 9.21.27 And later
PKI	8 EMudhra intermediate CAs	N/A	Private keys are generated in a state where they can be easily recovered, enabling certificate forgery	Update the trust stores in browsers, operating systems, and runtimes
PKI	Oracle Java JSSE	CVE-2026-91403 (CVSS 9.1)	Java update that treats eMudhra-related intermediate CAs as untrusted	Apply the latest updates for Java SE and GraalVM
File Sharing	Windows SMB Server	CVE-2026-96325 (CVSS 7.5)	Unauthenticated Remote Service Denial of Service	October Regular Security Updates Applied

Table 9. Status of Major Vulnerability Disclosures in October 2026

PHP2Shell illustrates just how short the response time has become. Information about the vulnerability was leaked externally before the Vulnerability Patch was released, and Amazon Threat Intelligence had already detected attack attempts on October 17—four days before the official disclosure. In Korea, the government also raised the cyber threat alert level for the private sector from “Attention” to “Caution” on October 22. Therefore, even for servers that have been patched, it is necessary to check access logs from the period before and after the disclosure and verify whether a web shell has been installed.

Oracle Java’s CVE-2026-91403 is not a general patch to fix a code flaw, but rather an update that prevents Java from trusting the compromised eMudhra intermediate CA certificate. Since runtimes that use their own trust stores—such as Java—and older clients must be updated separately even if browsers have blocked the certificate, PKI issues cannot be resolved by

server patches alone.

AI is also playing an increasingly significant role in the vulnerability discovery process. CVE-2026-94300 in BIND was reported by a researcher at OpenAI, and the official Node.Js announcement credited CVE-2026-111497 to OpenAI Codex Security. While this represents legitimate vulnerability research by the defense community, the fact that the same capabilities can be exploited by attackers suggests that patch cycles are likely to become even shorter in the future.

4. Agentic AI Attacks: From Experimentation to Real-World Application

Attacks in which AI agents autonomously carry out a sequence of actions—including reconnaissance, vulnerability scanning, penetration, and web shell installation—have begun to emerge as actual breach cases. Key reports released in October include the following as follows

Reporting Entity	Tools	Details Disclosed
CrowdStrike (October 7)	ARTEX	AI coding tool activity logs and ARTEX configuration files found on threat actors' servers targeting South Korean financial institutions Evidence of DeepSeek, GLM, and Grok usage
AhnLab ASEC (October 15)	ARTEX and variants	Tracked 600 IP addresses of ARTEX operational systems exposed to the internet; this number had increased to over 900 as of October 14 Secured 51 pieces of attack operation data—including web shell command transmissions, internal RDP relaying, and internal network scan results—from open directories on some hosts Traces of redistributed versions—which changed their names and user interfaces after the original repository was deleted—and Korean localization were also identified
NorForge, Reuters (October 19)	Cairn	An investigation of exposed Cairn management screens revealed more than 1,100 attack projects in the largest cluster Over 1,200 sites were attacked, compromising more than 100 corporate websites. The total cost of the tokens was approximately $5,000
GMO Iera (October 19)	ARTEX	Confirmed use of ARTEX in attack infrastructure targeting Japanese companies

Microsoft (October 21)	ARTEX	China-linked group Storm-0940 attacks hundreds of organizations worldwide using ARTEX The group exploited the credentials of a US IT managed services provider's cloud backup app to attempt logins to more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants; in some cases, they gained privileged access to the cloud within three hours of being targeted for the first time
CrowdStrike (October 21)	Various Harnesses	Four new threat actors observed between May and August disclosed Includes breaches at at least 15 Argentine healthcare institutions All four bypassed the safety mechanisms of commercial AI

Table 10. Reported Real-World Infiltration Cases Using Agentic AI

We also replicated ARTEX in a separate test environment to verify the extent of its autonomous penetration capabilities. We provided only a brief instruction—such as "Penetrate the attack target"—simple enough for even a user with no security knowledge to enter, yet ARTEX identified the file upload function on the web server and used a web shell to execute a program without any human intervention. In an environment where Apache ActiveMQ was exposed, ARTEX gained initial access via a known vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) and proceeded to execute remote commands on four internal hosts. Both experiments exploited vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in publicly accessible services rather than new techniques, showing that perimeter entry points become the first targets for AI agents.

Furthermore, even after the original GitHub repository was removed, ARTEX continues to be reused by various operators under different names and with modified interfaces. The redistributed versions verified by our company contained configurations for various LLMs—including DeepSeek, GLM, Kimi, and Claude—as well as traces of a publicly available PoC for an e-commerce platform vulnerability (CVE-2026-75650) exploitable without authentication and embedded IRC-based remote control code. This means that even if the developer stops releasing the tool, its spread does not stop.

What these reports reveal is a shift toward the economics of attack. In the Cairn case, the operator entered only a Chinese command of less than 100 characters, after which the agent—without human supervision—figured out how to perform code execution on each site and installed a web shell. Repetitive tasks that once required skilled personnel—such as vulnerability scanning, testing attack paths, modifying payloads, and retrying after failures—are now being entrusted to agents that work nonstop for hours on end. As it has become easy to combine

open-source AI models with freely available agent frameworks, cyberattacks that once required advanced technical skills are now within anyone's reach. Cases of non-technical hackers apprehended in Korea illustrate this, and the cost of carrying out such operations is dropping just as rapidly.

The Microsoft case also illustrates where these attacks are headed. Storm-0940's brute-force password attack generated up to 2,900 failed login attempts per minute but did not result in a single successful login. The actual breach occurred through the app credentials of a third-party service to which the customer had already granted access. While direct authentication held up, a trusted external connection was breached.

The extent to which tools like ARTEX were actually involved in incidents within the Korean financial sector is still under investigation. However, even based on publicly available reports alone, it is clear that attacks using AI agents have moved beyond the hypothetical stage and are being used in actual breaches, and the disclosed cases are likely only a fraction of the total.

5. Common Pattern: Breaches Starting at Perimeter Entry Points

When comparing cases in South Korea and Japan side by side, the patterns are nearly identical. It was not the internal core systems—where defenses are concentrated—that were breached, but rather peripheral touchpoints such as externally exposed app backend APIs, reservation sites, management tools, and outsourced SaaS services. Peripheral entry points collectively refer to the externally exposed attack surface, as well as supply chain and third-party touchpoints.

Types of Peripheral Touchpoints	Cases in South Korea	Japanese Cases	Common Vulnerabilities
Externally Exposed Application Backend APIs	Inquiry Service Exclusively for Loan Brokers	Member Information Lookup API, App and Online Store Servers	Inadequate authentication and authorization verification; failure to detect repeated queries
Additional Web Services	External web pages related to mutual aid, university portals	Department Store Reservation Sites	Security level lower than this Service; connection to core

			databases
Management and business tools	Sales Support System for Employees	Business management tools, BI tools	Accessible from outside the organization; delayed patching
Outsourced SaaS, supply chain	Backup service for enterprise accounting software	Email-Sending SaaS, Managed E-commerce Platforms, Managed FAQ Systems	A single breach can spread to multiple clients
Accounts, credentials	Employee VPN accounts, cloud accounts for training	Work-related cloud accounts, administrator accounts	Weak authentication, lack of multi-factor authentication
Neglected data	Temporary data files left in the cloud	System log files, data on former employees	Data past its retention period that has not been deleted

Table 11. Comparison of South Korean and Japanese Cases for Each Type of Perimeter Access Point

This assessment aligns precisely with the technical characteristics of AI-agent-based attacks. Rather than directly breaching highly fortified core systems, autonomous attack agents automatically scan the entire external attack surface and relentlessly exploit weak links on the periphery where security controls are relatively lax. Long-disclosed N-day vulnerabilities, configuration errors, and weak authentication are prime targets. Even minor ancillary services—which would likely be deprioritized by a human—become targets that an agent, operating at virtually no cost, will attempt to exploit without exception.

Another characteristic of peripheral entry points is that the damage does not end at that point. This is illustrated by cases where attacks spread from a booking site to a shared member database, from a third-party backup service to the data of tens of thousands of client companies, and from a third-party app's identity to a customer's cloud tenant. Even if peripheral touchpoints appear small in scale, they can serve as gateways to core data.

6. Changing Prevention and Security Strategies

A. Prevention: Redrawing Security from the Perimeter

The starting point for prevention is knowing exactly what an organization is exposing to the internet. Since threat actors are using AI agents to conduct comprehensive scans of external attack surfaces, defenders must also reassess their assets from the same perspective. In

particular, assets that have been pushed down the management priority list—such as ancillary services attached to the main service, event pages, management tools, and APIs called by apps—should be prioritized for inspection.

Scope	Inspection Items
Asset Management for Externally Exposed Assets	Compile a comprehensive list of web services, APIs, management pages, and remote access points exposed to the Internet, and assign responsible personnel. Block external access to unused services and test servers.
App Backend APIs	Assume that the app can be analyzed at any time. Verify server-side authentication and object-level authorization for all API requests, and do not embed API keys or authentication credentials within the app. Implement per-user query limits and detect abnormal repetitive queries.
Management and Business Tools	Ensure that management pages, BI tools, and sales support systems cannot be accessed directly from the outside; if unavoidable, apply IP restrictions and multi-factor authentication. Permissions for these tools to access the business database are minimized.
Outsourced SaaS and Supply Chain	Compile a list of data held by third-party providers and their access permissions. Regularly review the cloud permissions granted to third-party apps (such as OAuth consent), and specify the third-party provider's breach notification procedures in the contract.
Accounts and Authentication	Implement phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for VPNs, remote access, and business cloud accounts. Detect sudden spikes in failed login attempts and access from unusual locations to guard against attacks that use compromised account credentials obtained from external sources.
Patches and End-of-Support	Establish a separate procedure for components exposed to the internet (such as PHP, GitLab, Node.Js, and DNS servers) with the goal of responding on the same day a vulnerability is disclosed. Develop replacement plans for systems that have reached end-of-support, and minimize external exposure until then.
Data Minimization	We purge information on members whose retention period has expired, former employees, temporary development files, and logs containing personal information. Data that no longer exists cannot be leaked.
Detection and Monitoring	Collect logs from peripheral touchpoints at the same level as core systems and include them in 24-hour monitoring. Implement rules to detect post-compromise behavior, such as web servers executing shells or download tools.

Table 12. Preventive Inspection Items Focused on Perimeter Endpoints

It is also important to consider that attacks using AI agents are fast. Given that there have been cases where it took less than three hours from initial targeting to privileged access, the

traditional cycle of patching within a few days after a manual inspection may be too slow to respond. Automated response measures—such as the preemptive application of web firewall rules and the immediate blocking of exposed assets—must be prepared in advance. Conversely, it is advisable for the defense side to utilize AI-based vulnerability assessments to identify weak points in the perimeter before threat actors do.

B. Response: What to Do When a Breach Is Suspected

The scale of damage from a breach incident varies significantly depending on the speed of the initial response. In this case as well, there were instances where the damage was not recognized until several days after the attack, during which time additional data leaks could have occurred.

Multi-stage	Response Details
Initial Response	Block the attacking IP addresses and exploited paths, and isolate the affected Service. To preserve evidence, do not immediately reset the server; instead, secure the logs, memory, and disk images first.
Scope Verification	Trace access trails from the compromised external endpoint to connected databases, internal systems, and third-party vendor systems. In the event that vulnerability information was leaked prior to public disclosure, review logs retroactively up to the date of disclosure.
Credential Management	Accounts, API keys, and access tokens associated with the breach path are revoked and reissued. Verify whether any persistence mechanisms, such as web shells, remain.
Reporting	In Korea, in accordance with the Information and Communications Network Act, report the breach to the Ministry of Science and ICT or the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA; dial 118 without an area code) within 24 hours of becoming aware of the incident. If personal information has been leaked, in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Act, notify the data subjects within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach and report the incident to the Personal Information Protection Commission or KISA. Financial institutions must report to the Financial Supervisory Service, and cases of cybercrime must be reported to the Cyber Investigation Division of the National Police Agency.
Preventing Secondary Damage	Since phishing attacks, smishing, and brute-force attacks using the leaked information may follow, advise users to change their passwords and be wary of fraudulent contact attempts. Do not comply with any monetary demands from the threat actor; instead, consult with law enforcement agencies.

Table 13. Step-by-Step Response Procedures in Case of a Suspected Breach

C. Time to Shift the Center of Gravity of Defense

The incidents during Black October show that the center of gravity in security is shifting. Many organizations have designed their defenses around core systems, but attackers have found their way in through smaller entry points outside those systems. AI agents have made this reconnaissance cheaper and faster, with smaller assets that had been neglected in management becoming the first targets.

Therefore, future defense strategies must begin by asking where threat actors can enter, rather than focusing solely on what to protect most rigorously. Asset management of externally exposed assets, API authentication and authorization, controlling connections to third-party vendors, multi-factor authentication, prompt patching, and data minimization are not new measures. However, these incidents have clearly demonstrated that if these basic measures are not applied without exception to all perimeter touchpoints, AI will be the first to find those gaps—which is why this report focuses on AI-driven automated attacks and perimeter touchpoint breaches.

Analysis Report
ARTEX Cyber Threat In-Depth Analysis

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